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Abstract—Academic publication of latest research results are
crucial to advance development of all disciplines. However, there
are a number of severe disadvantages in current academic
publication systems. The first problem is the misconduct during
the publication process due to the opaque paper review process.
An anonymous reviewer may give biased comments to a paper
without being noticed or punished, because the comments are
seldom published for evaluation. Secondly, the author anonymity
during the paper review process is easily compromised since this
information is simply open to the conference chair or the journal
editor. Last but not least, access to research papers is restricted to
only subscribers, and even the authors cannot access their own
papers. In this paper, we propose Open-Pub, a decentralized,
transparent yet privacy-preserving academic publication scheme
using the blockchain technology, aiming to reduce academic
misconducts and promote free sharing of research results. To this
end, we design a threshold group signature to achieve anonymity
for reviewers and authors. With this group signature, authors can
choose to submit papers anonymously and validators take turns
to distribute papers anonymously to reviewers on the blockchain
according to their research interests. After the reviewers submit
their review comments, the identities of reviewers and anonymous
authors will be disclosed. These processes will be recorded on
the blockchain so that everyone can trace the entire process.
To evaluate its efficiency, we implement Open-Pub based on
Ethereum source code and conduct comprehensive experiments
to evaluate its performance, including computation cost and
processing delay. The experiment results show that Open-Pub
is highly efficient in computation and processing anonymous
transactions.
Index Terms—Publication, Blockchain, Privacy, Anonymity,
Threshold Group Signature
I. INTRODUCTION
In academia, publishing latest research achievements on
academic publications can significantly promote advances of
sciences and technologies. In current publication systems,
the publication procedure roughly includes paper submission,
assignment, review and the final publication. Most mainstream
academic publishers work in this way, such as Elsevier,
Springer, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE) and Association for Computing Machinery (ACM).
Meanwhile, there are some online systems like EDAS [1] and
Easychair [2] to manage submitted manuscripts for confer-
ences and journals.
Current publication systems have a number of serious
problems, which should be addressed for the benefit of the
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whole community. The first problem is academic misconducts
due to the opaque reviewing process. Normally, a paper is
given to several reviewers to examine its contributions and
novelties objectively. Unfortunately, reviewers are likely to
give biased comments that are not solely based on research
merits for multiple reasons, e.g. intense competitions among
researchers, conflict of interest and personal preferences.
The current review process also lacks mechanisms to moti-
vate reviewers to provide constructive and unbiased comments.
A reviewer is seldom rewarded for his/her valuable comments
that help to improve the reviewed manuscript, so he/she will
not try to provide the most constructive comments for the au-
thors. On the other hand, a reviewer’s comments are normally
not open to the public, so the reviewer is not accused even if
he/she provide totally wrong comments. Clearly, making the
paper review process transparent can certainly alleviate this
problem.
The second problem is anonymity during the review phase.
In the current paper review process, many journals and con-
ferences adopt the double-blind or single-blind approach. For
the double-blind review, the reviewers and the author do not
know each other, while in the single-blind review the reviewers
know the authors. Unfortunately, the anonymity of the review
process can be easily compromised, causing biased results. It
will be beneficial if the review process can effectively preserve
anonymity for reviewers and authors.
In addition, it is important to share latest research achieve-
ments in academia. Currently, many preprint systems publish
and share research results in different disciplines without peer
review, e.g. arXiv [3], bioRxiv [4] and IACR eprint [5].
However, research results on these preprint systems may be
problematic because they are not reviewed by peers. On
the other hand, access to peer-reviewed papers published by
traditional publishers is usually restricted to registered users.
The emerging blockchain [6] technology can be utilized to
solve the problems in current academic publication systems.
The blockchain technology is originally designed as an open,
distributed ledger without any trusted party. Due to its ad-
vantages of decentralization, transparency, fault-tolerance and
credibility, blockchain has been applied in many fields such as
finance, insurance, notarization, healthcare, logistics, internet
of things and social network.
In this paper, we propose Open-Pub, a transparent and
privacy-preserving decentralized academic publication system
based on the blockchain technology. To balance openness and
limitation, Open-Pub is based on a consortium blockchain
operated by multiple validators in a decentralized way, and
the entire review process will be recorded on the blockchain.
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2Everyone can trace the entire process from the submission of
the paper to the final publication.
Open-Pub utilizes the underlying consortium blockchain to
realize transparent paper review, making review comments
open to everyone on the blockchain. The reviewers are re-
warded according to the quality of their comments, and
hence they are motivated to provide unbiased and constructive
comments for authors. To achieve anonymity during the review
process in Open-Pub, we develop a threshold group signature
scheme TIBGS from the identity-based group signature in [7].
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
• We propose Open-Pub, a transparent and decentral-
ized academic publication system that is based on the
blockchain technology. Open-Pub is an effective solution
that integrates Verifiable Secret Sharing [8], Identity-
based Group Signature, threshold signature [9] and the
blockchain technique to realize anonymous paper review
and publication. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first decentralized privacy-preserving academic publica-
tion system based on blockchain.
• We design TIBGS, a Threshold Identity-based Group
Signature scheme used to manage keys for Open-Pub. The
master private key is shared among a group of managers,
instead of a single manager as [7]. By using TIBGS in
Open-Pub, we can achieve anonymous peer review.
• We implement Open-Pub by modifying Ethereum [10]
source code and conduct comprehensive experiments to
evaluate its performance. We test the computation and
communication costs for each type of operations in Open-
Pub, and the result shows that Open-Pub is efficient in
terms of both computation and communication.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We first
review research work related to blockchain privacy protection
and application of blockchain in academic publication in
Section II. Then we provide preliminaries on our proposal,
including cryptographic building blocks in Section III. Next,
we describe a threshold identity-based group signature al-
gorithm TIBGS and analyze its security in section IV. We
then present Open-Pub in detail in Section V. After that, we
give a comprehensive discussion and analysis of Open-Pub
in Section VI. We describe details on the implementation of
Open-Pub and evaluate its performance in Section VII. Finally,
concluding remarks are given in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we introduce the work related to privacy-
preserving blockchain and the application of blockchain in
paper publishing.
A. Privacy-Preserving Blockchains
The first blockchain system Bitcoin [6] was invented by
Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008. In public blockchains, all transac-
tions are public and can be verified by every participant. Trans-
action amounts and the links between transactions are publicly
visible. However, privacy issues emerge as a serious problem
for blockchains. As a result, a number of privacy-preserving
solutions for blockchains have been proposed recently.
Monero [11] was one of the most successful privacy-
preserving cryptocurrencies using ring signature [12]. The ring
signature allows a member of a set to sign on behalf of the
set. Unlike the group signature, there is no way to revoke the
anonymity of a ring signature. Although the ring signature
provides strong anonymity, there are some limitations. First,
the size of a ring signature is directly proportional to the
number of participants. Thus in Monero, there are 4 outputs
per transaction by default. Second, its transactions (especially
RingCT transactions) are very large in size, with almost thou-
sands of bytes per transaction. It will increase the storage space
for the entire blockchain records. Monero is an untraceable
digital currency, with transaction details completely invisible
to the public.
Another widely used privacy-preserving cryptocurrency is
Zerocash [13], an anonymous cryptocurrency based on Bit-
coin. Zerocash makes use of zk-SNARKs (zero-knowledge
succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge) [14] proofs
and a commitment scheme to hide transaction amounts
and participants. Zerocash implements the highest level of
anonymity and transaction privacy protection for blockchain,
but it is computationally expensive in generating transaction
proofs. In addition, zk-SNARKs require a trusted setup. If
the adversary is aware of the secret randomness used in the
setup, the adversary can generate deceptive proofs for false
statements, and the false statements are indistinguishable from
true statements.
Ring signature and zk-SNARKs can provide strong privacy
protection for blockchains, but they do not have the identity
disclosure functionality as group signature, which is an im-
portant feature employed by Open-Pub.
B. Blockchain for Publication
A number of attempts have been made to utilize the
blockchain to promote scientific publication. Novotny et
al. [15] highlight the transparency of the blockchain system for
academic publishing. Janowicz et al. [16] present an outline
that aims to combine distributed ledger technologies and aca-
demic publishing. Leible et al. [17] introduce the adaptability,
challenges and research potential between blockchain and
open science. Heaven et al. [18] introduce the advantages
and challenges of blockchain to scientific publishing. Duh et
al. [19] present some social dilemmas occurring in academic
publishing through a strategic game setting and show that
building a trusted scientific community is the key to promote a
publish-and-flourish culture. Mohan et al. [20] emphasize the
use of blockchain to tackle academic misconduct.
Eureka [21], [22] is a blockchain-based scientific publishing
platform, developed to address traditional inefficient processes,
long delays, and lack of fair financial incentives in the current
academic publishing industry. Eureka maps the review process
to the blockchain through smart contracts and designs a token-
based incentive mechanism.
PubChain [23] uses blockchain, smart contract and IPFS
peer-to-peer file-sharing system to implement a decentral-
ized open-access publication platform. PubChain utilizes the
3blockchain technology to incentivize participation of authors,
readers and reviewers, and carries out a simulation to study
the proposed decentralized scoring system.
TIM et al. [24] propose a governance framework for sci-
entific publishing, aiming to enhance transparency, account-
ability, and trust in the publishing process. The goal of the
framework is to create an ecosystem allowing participants to
eventual self-govern and agree on how to fairly enforce the
rules and norms.
Coelho et al. [25] propose a system to solve incentive
problems of traditional systems in science communication and
publishing, and present a minimal working model to define
roles, processes, and expected results of the novel system.
Antonio et al. [26] propose a decentralized publication
system for open science based on blockchain and IPFS, and
develop a proof-of-concept prototype. In addition to fairness
and transparency, the authors also noticed the privacy require-
ment.
Unfortunately, all these works did not solve the privacy
problem during the paper review process, while Open-Pub
aims to tackle this challenge for blockchain-based academic
publication.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we will introduce some cryptographic tech-
niques used in Open-Pub, including Bilinear Map, Verifiable
Secret Sharing (VSS), an asymmetric encryption algorithm and
two signature algorithms.
TABLE I
Notations
Notation Meaning
λ security parameter
H() a hash function
G() a function that maps a string to a integer
(mpk,msk) master public key and private key
grpID the group identifier
S a set of group managers
(gsk, gvk) group secret key and verify key
userID the user identifier
usk group private key
σ signature
(k, n) threshold
A. Bilinear Map and Related Assumptions
Choose a security parameter λ, a bilinear group description,
(q,G, Gˆ,GT , e), can be generated by an algorithm G. In this
description, e is used as an efficiently computable bilinear map
defined on cyclic bilinear groups G, Gˆ and GT of order q > 2λ
as e: G× Gˆ→ GT , which satisfies the following properties:
1) Bilinearity: e(ga, gˆb) = e(g, gˆ)ab for all g ∈ G, gˆ ∈ Gˆ
and a, b ∈ Z∗p .
2) Non-degeneracy:e(g, gˆ) 6= 1.
B. Pedersen’s Verifiable Secret Sharing
A (k, n) Pedersen’s verifiable secret sharing scheme [8]
enables n participants to share a random value x without a
trusted third party, and at least k participants (1 ≤ k ≤ n)
can participants to restore x. Before x is restored, the random
secret value x is kept secret from all participants. Each
participant obtains a share xi known by participant i only.
More importantly, each participant can verify validity of xi,
so as to detect invalid messages sent by malicious participants.
Let P1, P2, · · · , Pn be the n participants. The protocol for Pi
is:
1) Choose a random number si,0 ∈ Zq;
2) Distribute si,0 verifiably among P1, P2, · · · , Pn and Pj can
get si,j ;
3) Verify n− 1 received shares;
4) After receiving n− 1 correct shares, Pi compute the share
si = s1,i + s2,i + s3,i + · · · + sn,i. The complete secret
s = s1,0 + s2,0 + · · ·+ sn,0 is shared among n participants.
Later we will use Pedersen’s VSS scheme in our protocol,
and use (k, n)-VSS to denote a Pedersen’s VSS scheme for
(k, n) secret sharing.
C. Cryptographic Building Blocks
An asymmetric encryption [27] scheme can be repre-
sented by a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms Πenc =
(Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Dec).
• Setup(1λ)→ pp. On input a security parameter λ, this
algorithm generates a list of public parameters pp.
• KeyGen(pp) → (pk, sk). On input a list of public
parameters pp, this algorithm generates a public/secret
key pair (pk, sk).
• Enc(m, pk) → c. With a public key pk, this algorithm
encrypts an input plaintext m to output a ciphertext c.
• Dec(c, sk) → m. With a secret key sk, this algorithm
decrypts an input ciphertext c to output a plaintext m.
A signature scheme can be represented by a tuple of
polynomial-time algorithms Πs = (Setup, KeyGen, Sign,
Verify).
• Setup(1λ)→ pp. On input a security parameter λ, this
algorithm generates a list of public parameters pp.
• KeyGen(pp) → (pk, sk). On input a list of public
parameters pp, this algorithm generates a public/private
key pair (pk, sk).
• Sign(m, sk)→ sig. With a private key sk, this algorithm
generate a signature sig corresponding to the message m.
• Verify(pk,m, sig) → {0, 1}.This algorithm can verify
whether the signature sig is generated by private key sk
corresponding to public key pk.
A (k, n) threshold signature on a message m is a
single, constant-sized aggregate signature that passes
verification if and only if at least k out of the n
participants sign m. Note that the verifier does not need
to know the identities of the k signers. A (k, n) threshold
signature scheme involves n participants, which can be
represented by a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms Πts =
4(Setup,ThresKeyGen,ThresSign,SigShareVer,
SigShareComb,Verify).
• Setup(1λ)→ pp. On input a security parameter λ, this
algorithm generates a list of public parameters pp.
• ThresKeyGen(pp, k, n) → (PK, ski, vki). On in-
put a list of public parameters pp, this algorithm
generates a public key PK, a set of n secret key
shares {sk1, sk2, ..., skn} and a set of verification keys
{vk1, vk2, ..., vkn}.
• ThresSign(m, ski) → sigi. Each participant signs the
message m with a secret key share ski and output a
signature share sigi.
• SigShareVer(PK, vki,m, sigi) → {0, 1}. The algo-
rithm can verify the correctness of the signature share
sigi by PK and the corresponding vki.
• SigShareComb(sigis, k) → sig. With at least k valid
signature shares sigi’s, this algorithm calculates the com-
plete signature sig.
• Verify(PK,m, sig) → {0, 1}. The algorithm can verify
the correctness of the complete signature sig by PK.
Πenc used in our scheme needs to satisfy key indistin-
guishability and ciphertext indistinguishability under chosen-
ciphertext attack [28]. Πs and Πts should satisfy unforgeability
and robustness against adaptive identity [29] and chosen
message attacks [30].
IV. TIBGS: THRESHOLD IDENTITY-BASED GROUP
SIGNATURE
In this section, we describe TIBGS, a threshold identity-
based group signature algorithm. A group signature [31]
scheme allows a member of a group to sign a message
anonymously without leaking identity information. A group
manager can open the group signature to disclose the true
identity of the signer.
TIBGS involves 3 different participants: n group managers,
group users and verifier. In contrast to normal group signature
schemes, the number of group managers has increased from
1 to n.
In TIBGS, we use (k, n)-VSS to decentralize the master
private key msk, the group secret key gsk and the group verify
key gvk to n managers, with each manager holding only a
secret shadow. Therefore, each manager can only produce a
portion of the group private key uski for the group user through
gsk and userID. With k uski’s corresponding to userID, a
user can computes complete group private key usk, which
is used to sign anonymously on behalf of the group. With
a group signature σ from the group, others can not find the
signer for this signature and verifier can use grpID and master
public key mpk to verify the correctness of the signature.
Finally, anonymous signers can be exposed by at least k
group managers. As a result, TIBGS realizes decentralize
cryptographic operations including key generation, signature
and opening. It enables Open-Pub to manage identity-based
keys and carry out cryptographic operations in a decentralized
way.
A. Framework and Security of TIBGS
TIBGS is composed of 8 polynomial-time
algorithms TIBGS = (Setup,GrpSetUp,ExtShare,
ReconstKey, Sign, Verify, OpenPart,Open) as
defined below:
• Setup(1λ, k, n)→ (mpk,mski). Each manager can run
this algorithm to generate master public key mpk and
master private key share mski.
• GrpSetUp(grpID, i,mski, k, n) → (gski, gvki). This
algorithm on input of grpID and mski and outputs a
group secret/verify key pair (gski, gvki) corresponding to
ith manager.
• ExtShare(userID, gski) → uski. The group manager
executes the algorithm and outputs the group private key
share uski, which is sent to the user.
• ReconstKey(userID, {uski}i∈S, {gvki}i∈S) → usk.
The user executes the algorithm to reconstruct its full
private key from the secret shares obtained from man-
agers.
• Sign(m, usk)→ σ. Each user can execute the algorithm
and generate a signature σ corresponding to the message
m.
• Verify(m,σ,mpk, grpID)→ {0, 1}. This algorithm can
verify whether the signature is generated by user in the
group grpID.
• OpenPart(gski, σ,m) → oki. The group manager can
execute the algorithm and obtain an intermediate result
oki.
• Open(k, {oki}i∈S) → userID. The group manager can
execute the algorithm and reveal the identifier userID of
the user who produced the signature σ corresponding to
the message m.
The concrete construction of TIBGS is defined in Fig. 1.
We formulate the security of TIBGS with two security
experiments, the full-anonymity experiment in Fig. 11 and the
full-traceability experiment in Fig. 12 in Appendix.
Definition 1 (Full-anonymity). Let Π = (Setup,
GrpSetUp, ExtShare, ReconstKey, Sign, Verify,
OpenPart, Open) be a threshold identity-based group
signature scheme. We say that Π is fully anonymous if for
all sufficiently large security parameter k ∈ N and any
proper probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A, its
advantage AdvanonΠ,A(1
λ) = |Pr[ExpanonΠ,A(1λ) = 1] - 12 | is
negligible.
Definition 2 (Full-traceability). Let Π = (Setup,
GrpSetUp, ExtShare, ReconstKey, Sign, Verify,
OpenPart, Open) be a threshold identity-based group
signature scheme. We say that Π is fully traceable if for
all sufficiently large security parameter k ∈ N and any
proper probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A, its
advantage AdvtraceΠ,A (1
λ) = Pr[ExptraceΠ,A (1
λ) = 1] is negligible.
For a threshold scheme, the following robustness property
is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Robustness). A TIBGS scheme is said to be
robust if it computes a correct output even in the presence
5TIBGS.Setup(1λ, k, n)→ (mpk,mski) :
1) A generator G generates public parameters (q,G, Gˆ,GT , g, gˆ2, e, uˆ0, uˆ1, uˆ2, uˆ3, uˆ4,n), where q > 2λ is a prime; (G, Gˆ) are two cyclic
groups of order q; e is a bilinear map: G × Gˆ → GT ; g, gˆ2 are generators of G, Gˆ respectively. Among them, uˆ0, uˆ1, uˆ2, uˆ3, uˆ4 ∈ Gˆ and
n ∈ GT .
2) Managers P1, P2, · · · , Pn use (k, n)-VSS to share a secret number α and Pi can get αi. Each manager calculates and broadcasts gαi . After
receiving at least k − 1 shares about gα, managers compute h1 ← gα.
h1 ← gα =
∏k
i=1(g
αi )L(i) = g
∑k
i=1 L(i)αi , L(i) =
∏k
j=1,j 6=i
j
j−i
3) Set mpk← (g, gˆ2, h1, uˆ0, uˆ1, uˆ2, uˆ3, uˆ4,n), mski ← h2,i = gˆαi2 . Note that nobody knows α and msk.
TIBGS.GrpSetUp(grpID, i,mski, k, n)→ (gski, gvki) :
1) Managers Pi runs (k, n)-VSS to share a secret number r1 with other managers, and gets r1,i.
2) Manager Pi uses grpID and r1,i to compute his group secret key gski ← (a0,i, a2,i, a3,i, a4,i, a5,i), where a0,i = gˆαi2 ·(uˆ0 ·uˆG(grpID)1 )r1,i ,
a2,i = uˆ
r1,i
2 , a3,i = uˆ
r1,i
3 , a4,i = uˆ
r1,i
4 , a5,i = g
r1,i .
3) Manager Pi publishes gvki = g
αi .
TIBGS.ExtShare(userID, gski)→ uski :
1) Manager Pi uses gski to compute uski ← (bi0 , bi3 , bi4 , bi5 ) for a user userID, where bi0 = a0,i ·a2,iG(userID),bi3 = a3,i,bi4 = a4,i,bi5 =
a5,i
TIBGS.ReconstKey(userID, {uski}i∈S, {gvki}i∈S)→ usk :
1) After receiving uski, the user uses gvki to verify: e(g, bi0 )
?
= e(gvki, g2) · e(bi5 , uˆ0) · e(bi5 , uˆG(grpID)1 ) · e(bi5 , uˆG(userID)2 ), e(g, bi3 )
?
=
e(bi5 , uˆ3), e(g, bi4 )
?
= e(bi5 , uˆ4).
2) The user selects a random value r2 ∈ Zq to compute usk← (bˆ0, bˆ3, bˆ4, b5).
bˆ0 =
∏k
i=1 b
L(i)
i0
· (uˆ0 · uˆG(grpID)1 · uˆG(userID)2 )r2 = gˆα2 · (uˆ0 · uˆG(grpID)1 · uˆG(userID)2 )r1+r2 ,
bˆ3 =
∏k
i=1 b
L(i)
i3
· uˆr23 = uˆr1+r23 , bˆ4 =
∏k
i=1 b
L(i)
i4
· uˆr24 = uˆr1+r24 , b5 =
∏k
i=1 b
L(i)
i5
· gr2 = gr1+r2
TIBGS.Sign(m, usk)→ σ :
1) The user selects two random values r3 ∈ Zq , f ∈ Zq , and a random masking identity rID. A signature σ ← (cˆ0, c5, cˆ6, e1, eˆ2, e3,
∑
) is
generated as:
cˆ0 ← bˆ0 · bˆm3 · bG(rID)4 · (uˆ0, ·uˆG(grpID)1 · uˆG(userID)2 · uˆm3 · uˆG(rID)4 )r3 = gˆα2 · (uˆ0, ·uˆG(grpID)1 · uˆG(userID)2 · uˆm3 · uˆG(rID)4 )r1+r2+r3
c5 ← b5 · gr3 = gr1+r2+r3 , cˆ6 ← uˆG(userID)2 · uˆG(rID)4 , e1 = gf , eˆ2 ← (uˆ0 · uˆG(grpID)1 )f , e3 ← nG(userID) · e(h1, gˆ2)f ,∑← POK(cˆ6 = uˆx2 · uˆy4 ∧ e1 = gz ∧ eˆ2 = (uˆ0 · uˆG(grpID)1 )z∧ e3 = n x · e(h1, gˆ2)z : (G(userID), G(rID), f))
TIBGS.Verify(m,σ,mpk, grpID)→ {0, 1} :
1) The verifier parses σ as (cˆ0, c5, cˆ6, e1, eˆ2, e3,
∑
). He generates random values t ∈ Zq , m ∈ GT and computes: d1 ← gt, dˆ2 ←
(uˆ0 · uˆG(grpID)1 · uˆm3 · c6)t, δ ← m ·e(h1, gˆ2)t
2) The verifier return 1 if m ?= δ · e(c5,dˆ2)
e(d1,cˆ0)
and
∑
is valid.
TIBGS.OpenPart(gski, σ,m)→ oki :
1) For a group signature σ = (cˆ0, c0, cˆ6, e1, eˆ2, e3,
∑
), manager Pi computes oki ← (oki1 , oki2 ), and sends oki to other managers, where
oki1 = e(e1, a0), oki2 = e(a5, eˆ2)
TIBGS.Open(k, {oki}i∈S)→ userID :
1) After received k − 1 oki’s, each manager computes a value λ←
∏k
i=1 ok
L(i)
i1∏k
i=1 ok
L(i)
i2
= e(h1, gˆ2)f
2) The manager iterates through all userID’s to find an userID that satisfies: e3 = nG(userID) · λ
Fig. 1: The Concrete Construction of TIBGS. POK denotes Proof of Knowledge, described in the Appendix
of a malicious attacker that makes the corrupted managers
deviate from the normal execution.
Theorem 1. Assuming that the IBGS scheme in [7] is fully
anonymous, the above TIBGS scheme is also fully anonymous.
The proof of the above theorem is deferred to Appendix.
Theorem 2. Assuming that the IBGS scheme in [7] is fully
traceable, the above TIBGS scheme is also fully traceable.
The proof is omitted because it is similar to that of the
full-anonymity theorem.
The following theorem states the robustness of the proposed
TIBGS scheme:
Theorem 3. Assuming that n ≥ 2k − 1 where (k, n) is the
threshold of the proposed TIBGS scheme, then it is robust in
the presence of up to k − 1 corrupted managers.
Proof. It is easy to see that k honest group managers are
required to generate a valid group private key usk, and at
most k−1 managers can be corrupted. In addition, each group
manager obtains a group verification key gvki corresponding
to its secret group key share gski. The group verification keys
are published for verifying group private key shares uski’s. As
a result, the user can check validity of the secret key shares
uski using gvki, and reconstruct his key from k valid user key
shares. To sum up, the proposed TIBGS scheme is robust if
n ≥ 2k − 1.
V. OPEN-PUB: THE TRANSPARENT YET
PRIVACY-PRESERVING ACADEMIC PUBLICATION SYSTEM
In this section we first provide the system model of Open-
Pub, and then present the threat model. After that, we describe
the design of Open-Pub, including its transaction management
and threshold identity management.
6authorA authorA authorA authorA authorA authorA
2.Submit paper 1.Generate key 7.Reward6.Send the result
(3, 5)
Threshold Collaboration Secret Key Anonymity
Blockchain Synchronization and 
Consensus
3.Distribute paper 4.Submit reviews 7.Reward
validator5validator1 validator3
(3, 5)
Disclose
5.Expose identity
validator2 validator4
reviewer1 reviewer2
...
reviewer1 reviewer2
...
reviewer1 reviewer2
...
Fig. 2: The system architecture and workflow of Open-Pub with 5 validators and threshold 3.
A. System Model
The system architecture of Open-Pub and the workflow are
depicted in Fig. 2. The Open-Pub system involves 4 different
participants with the following roles and responsibilities:
• Validator. Validators validate transactions and broadcast
transactions in Open-Pub. In addition, validators are re-
sponsible for the distribution of user secrete key, papers
and rewards. After the paper review, validators collaborate
to reveal the anonymous author and make the final result
public. Validators are also responsible for sending rewards
to authors and reviewers. All validators maintain Open-Pub
to work properly.
• Author. In the system, author needs to request group private
key shares uski’s from validators and computes complete
group private key usk. With usk, author can submit papers
anonymously or under real names. During the review pro-
cess, the author does not know who the reviewer is until
receiving reviewer comments. If the paper is accepted, the
author will receive a reward from the validators.
• Reviewer. Before the review process, reviewers register in
the blockchain based on different research areas, which
helps to find suitable reviewers. After receiving a paper
from the validator, the reviewer puts forward his own review
opinions and scores, which are conducted in the form of
sending transactions. The reviewer cannot know the real
identity of the anonymous author until the validators reveal
the author. After the review process, reviewers will receive
the review fees.
• Reader. Any registered member of Open-Pub can be con-
sidered as a reader, and readers can read and comment on
papers in Open-Pub.
At registration, an author can get a group private key share
uski from each validator and calculate the complete the group
private key usk with a sufficient number of shares (Step 1).
Authors can choose to submit papers under their real names or
anonymously, where anonymous submissions are signed using
the group private key usk (Step 2).
After the validators receive the submitted papers, they take
turns as distributors to select reviewers for the paper based
on the research area (Step 3). In order to hide the identities
of reviewers, the distributor will use the public keys of the
reviewers to encrypt the identity and paper information, and
send the ciphertext and deadline to the blockchain. Only the
corresponding reviewer can use his/her private key to decrypt
the ciphertext to get the paper information. Reviewers review
and grade papers using their real names, and they do not know
the real identity of the anonymous authors in the process
(Step 4). The identities of the unreviewed reviewers remain
confidential.
When the deadline is reached, the distributor will publish
the result of the paper based on existing reviews, and multiple
validators cooperate to expose the anonymous author (Step
5-6). To motivate reviewers and authors, validators will pay
review fees to reward reviewers, and if the papers are accepted,
the validators will pay rewards to encourage the authors (Step
7). The blockchain makes the entire review process visible to
all members, including registration, submission, distribution,
review, opening and reward, making the review process open
and transparent.
We emphasize that how much the authors and the reviewers
7should be rewarded is an independent research problem, and
we leave it as the future work. These rewards are created by
validators following a pre-determined rule, like the incentive
mechanism in Bitcoin. Any appropriate rewarding mechanism
can be used in Open-Pub, but we assume these rewards are
fixed in the following description.
Open-Pub relies on threshold identity-based group signature
scheme TIBGS to manage identity-based keys, where the
validators perform the duties of group managers and the
authors can be viewed as group members.
B. Threat Model
We assume a Byzantine threat model in which the adversary
can compromise no more than 1/3 validators of blockchain.
Instead of following the specified protocol, the compromised
validators will act arbitrarily and may collude with each
other to coordinate attacks, including injecting, modifying
and dropping messages during participating in the protocol.
However, the adversary is assumed to have limited computa-
tion resources and cannot break the cryptosystem used in our
proposal.
Open-Pub aims to achieve the following design goals:
• Accountability. Whenever there is a misconduct or abuse in
the system, the system should be able to identify the author
or the reviewer according to the corresponding transaction.
• Anonymity. The identity of the anonymous author is kept
secret during the review process and multiple validators
collaborate to reveal the identity of the anonymous author
after the review is complete. During the review process, no
one except the distributor and the reviewers themselves can
know which papers the reviewers have been assigned.
• Recoverability. When the group private key of an author is
lost, it should be recoverable.
C. Open-Pub
We will describe in detail how Open-Pub utilizes the
threshold identity-based group signature to implement a de-
centralized privacy-preserving academic publication system on
blockchain. The system consists of the following 7 steps: sys-
tem initialization, registration, submission, distribution, review,
open and reward. To implement these steps, we create five
types of transactions including txtransfer, txsubmit, txdistribute,
txreview and txopen, and we introduce the processing logic of
these transactions. We specify that the first element of the
transaction structure is the public key of the sender pksender
and the second is the public key of the receiver pkreceiver. For
anonymous transactions, we uniformly set the public key of
the sender to pkanonymity.
1) System Initialization. To initialize the system, valida-
tors that perform the duties of group managers run
TIBGS.Setup and TIBGS.GrpSetUp with grpID to
generate master public key mpk, master private key share
mski, group secret key share gski and group verify key share
gvki. Each validator initializes to create key pair (pk, sk),
and we use pk to represent the account. All validators
maintain a (k, n) threshold signature account whose public
key is accpub for storing deposits, review fees and layout
fees. In this step, we will stipulate the amount of deposit
$deposit, review fee $review and incentive fee $incentive.
Algorithm 1: - SystemInitialization
Input: λ, k, n, grpID
Output: mpk,mski, gski, gvki, pk, sk, accpub, tski, tvki
1 mpk,mski = TIBGS.Setup (1
λ, k, n);
2 gski, gvki = TIBGS.GrpSetUp(grpID, i,mski, k, n);
3 pps = Πs.Setup(1
λ);
4 pk, sk = Πs.KeyGen(pps);
5 ppts = Πts.Setup(1
λ);
6 accpub, tski, tvki = Πts.ThresKeyGen(ppts, k, n);
7 return mpk,mski, gski, gvki, pk, sk, accpub, tski, tvki;
2) Registration. The system accepts the input of the userID
and creates key pair (pk, sk) for various types of users.
Users can sign up for three types of accounts: reader,
reviewer, and author. A type identifier is used to distinguish
these accounts, with a type 0 for reader, a type 1 for
reviewer, and a type 2 for author. At the same time, author
accounts need to pay $deposit to accpub through txtransfer
to prevent author from sabotaging the blockchain through
anonymous transactions. After the deposit is confirmed, the
validator will run TIBGS.ExtShare to generate uski and
send it to author account, and the author can calculate the
complete usk by TIBGS.ReconstKey. For the reviewer
account, they need to register professional directions, such
as machine learning, cloud computing, blockchain, etc.
Algorithm 2: - AuthorRegistration
Input: λ, userID, accpub, gski, gvki, $deposit, k
Output: pk, sk, txtransfer, usk
1 pps = Πs.Setup(1
λ);
2 pk, sk = Πs.KeyGen(pp);
3 if $deposit < GetBalance(pk) /*GetBalance() is a function to
get the account balance*/ then
4 return pk, sk;
5 else
6 v = $deposit;
7 txorigin = (pk, accpub, userID, v);
8 sig = Πs.Sign(txorigin, sk);
9 txtransfer = (txorigin, sig);
10 set the balance of pk to GetBalance(pk)− v;
11 set the balance of accpub to GetBalance(accpub) + v;
12 send userID to each validator to get uski=TIBGS.
ExtShare(userID, gski) and store them in set Suski ;
13 if GetNum(Suski) ≥ k /*GetNum() is a function that gets
the size of a set*/ then
14 usk = TIBGS.ReconstKey(userID, {uski}i∈S,
{gvki}i∈S);
15 return pk, sk, txtransfer, usk;
3) Submission. In the system, only the author account can
submit the paper body to the database maintained by the
validators and return the hash hpaper. The database does
not record the identity of the author. Paper submission
can be divided into real-name submission and anonymous
submission. A tag is used to distinguish between two
types of submission, with a tag of real indicating real-
name submission and a tag of anonymity indicating
8anonymous submission. A real-name submit transaction
includes (pk, accpub, real, field, userID, title, hpaper,
sig) and an anonymous submit transaction includes
(pkannoymity, accpub, annoymity, field, title, hpaper, ssig). To
generate an anonymous transaction, the author can run
TIBGS.Sign with usk to generate a group signature ssig.
Others, including validators, can verify the accuracy of ssig
through TIBGS.verify. But unlike ordinary signatures,
no one can discover the true identity of the signer, except
that the signer is a member of the group. The recipient of
txsubmit is accpub.
Algorithm 3: - Submission
Input: tag, field, userID, title, hpaper, pk, sk, pkannoymity, accpub, usk
Output: txsubmit
1 if tag = real then
2 txorigin = (pk, accpub, tag, field, userID, title, hpaper);
3 sig = Πs.Sign(txorigin, sk);
4 txsubmit = (txorigin, sig);
5 else if tag = anonymity then
6 txorigin = (pkannoymity, accpub, tag, field, title, hpaper);
7 ssig = TIBGS.Sign(txorigin, usk);
8 txsubmit = (txorigin, ssig);
9 return txsubmit;
4) Distribution. The validators take turns as distributors to
distribute the papers submitted by authors. When new
txsubmit appears on the blockchain, distributor randomly
selects reviewers based on paper field. To hide the
identity of reviewers, the distributor signs htxsubmit and
reviewerID with its own sk, and then encrypts the sig-
nature, htxsubmit , and reviewerID with the pk of the re-
viewer. The ciphertext is published as part of txdistribute,
but only the corresponding reviewer can decrypt the ci-
phertext and get htxsubmit . In addition, this operation spec-
ifies the deadline for the review of the paper, which
is denoted by endtime. A distribute transaction includes
(pk, accpub, htxsubmit , ciphertext..., endtime, sig), which the
distributor sends to accpub.
Algorithm 4: - Distribution
Input: htxsubmit , reviewerIDs, endtime, pk, sk, accpub
Output: txdistribute
1 for each reviewerID in reviewerIDs do
2 pkr = GetPK(reviewerID);
3 /*GetPK() is a function to get the pk of the ID*/;
4 sigdis = Πs.Sign((htxsubmit , reviewerID),sk);
5 c = Πenc.Enc((sigdis, htxsubmit , reviewerID), pkr);
6 store c in set Sciphertext;
7 txorigin = (pk, accpub, htxsubmit , Sciphertext, endtime);
8 sig = Πs.Sign(txorigin, sk);
9 txdistribute = (txorigin, sig);
10 return txdistribute;
5) Review. After txdistribute is confirmed, reviewer can
retrieve txdistribute to find the corresponding ciphertext
c. By decrypting the ciphertext, reviewer can obtain
plaintext including a signature, htxsubmit and reviewerID.
Through htxsubmit , the reviewer finds the paper in
the database and reviews it. The reviewer will post
comment and score through a review transaction including
(pk, pkdis, reviewerID, htxsubmit , comment, score, sigdis, c, sig),
which will be sent to the distributor. Until now, the
author can know the true identity of this reviewer and
the identities of reviewers who have not reviewed remain
unknown. Readers can find and read the paper through
htxsubmit , and they can comment on the paper through the
review transaction, which will be sent to accpub.
Algorithm 5: - Review
Input: reviewerID, txdistribute, pk, sk
Output: txreview
1 for each c in txdistribute.Sciphertext do
2 if p = Πenc.Dec(c, sk) then
3 sigdis, htxsubmit , reviewerID = p;
4 if Πs.Verify(txdistribute.pk, (htxsubmit , reviewerID),
sigdis)
?
= 1 then
5 break;
6 else
7 return;
8 find the paper through htxsubmit , and review it to get comment
and score;
9 pkdis = txdistribute.pk;
10 txorigin = (pk, pkdis, reviewerID, htxsubmit , comment, score,
sigdis, c);
11 sig = Πs.Sign(txorigin, sk);
12 txreview = (txorigin, sig);
13 return txreview;
6) Open. After reaching the endtime of the paper, validator
who distributes the paper will publish the author, the re-
viewers and the review result. Until then, the identity of the
anonymous author has not been revealed. The distributor
sends an open request and txsubmit to all validators, all of
whom run TIBGS.OpenPart to generate oki and return
it to the distributor. With at least k oki’s, the distributor
runs TIBGS.Open to find the identity userID of the
anonymous author. Finally, validator publishes the final
result of the paper through the open transaction including
(pk, accpub, htxsubmit , userID, result, reviewerIDs, skdis, sig).
7) Reward. After the open operation, validators shall pay the
review fee $review to reviewers, and validators shall pay the
incentive fee $incentive to author if the result is accpet. These
rewards will be paid out of account accpub. If the deposit
submitted by the author still exists, the deposit will be
returned to the author. To decentralize power, a txtransfer
transaction transferred from accpub requires a threshold
signature. The transaction passes verification only after at
least k validators have signed the transaction.
8) VerTx. Validators call this algorithm to check the validity
of all types of transactions and then update the state of
related accounts. The algorithm outputs b = 1 if tx is valid,
otherwise it outputs b = 0.
VI. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we first discuss details of Open-Pub, then
analyze its anonymity, accountability and recoverability.
9Algorithm 6: - Open
Input: txsubmit, txdistribute, reviewerIDs, result, gski,k, pk, sk, accpub
Output: txopen
1 if Time() ≥ txdistribute.endtime/*Time() is a function to get the
current time*/ then
2 if txsubmit.tag = real then
3 userID = txsubmit.userID;
4 else if txsubmit.tag = anonymity then
5 oki = TIBGS.OpenPart(gski, txsubmit.ssig,
txsubmit);
6 send txsubmit to other validator to get other oki’s and
store them in set Soki ;
7 if GetNum(Soki) ≥ k then
8 userID = TIBGS.Open(k, {oki}i∈S);
9 txorigin = (pk, accpub, htxsubmit , userID, result, reviewerIDs );
10 sig = Πs.Sign(txorigin, sk);
11 txopen = (txorigin, sig);
12 return txopen;
13 else
14 return;
A. Discussion
Hierarchical blockchains. In Open-Pub, we design a single
blockchain for one subject, however, there are many scien-
tific subjects, which are difficult to be implemented in the
single blockchain. To solve this issue, we can create a multi-
level hierarchy of blockchains for Open-Pub. For example,
a 3-layer hierarchical blockchain structure for Open-Pub is
as follows: first layer is a root blockchain maintained by
publishers (denoted as publisher-chain), second layer contains
multiple blockchains supporting different subjects respectively
(denoted as subject-chain), and third layer runs multiple single
blockchains designed in Open-Pub (denoted as paper-chain).
These three types of blockchains form a hierarchical tree
structure which each node of the tree structure is a blockchain,
and all paper-chains are independent and have no influence on
each other. Note that the lower-level blockchain should upload
periodically blocks to the higher-level blockchain to achieve
the integrity and immutability of all the blocks of the lower-
level blockchain.
Malicious participants. In Open-Pub, the participants of
the single blockchain contains validators (or publishers), au-
thors, reviewers and readers, which cannot attack Open-Pub
without loss of personal assets. There are some reasons to
explain the above occasion: (i) the single blockchain in Open-
Pub is a consortium blockchain with a secure consensus
algorithm such as PBFT allowing that f validators fail at
most; (ii) we require that each author should pay a deposit
when registering an account, which means that a malicious
author cannot withdraw his payment; (iii) if a reviewer forgers
a review, he/she will lost his reputation; (iv) a reader only
have the ability to read and comment papers, which does
not affect the review procedure of papers. Moreover, all
operations of these malicious participants are recorded on
the blockchain, everyone can trace the related transactions to
check the malicious operations.
Algorithm 7: - Reward
Input: txopen, $review, $incentive, accpub, tski, k, sk
Output: txtransfers
1 for each reviewerID ∈ txopen.reviewerIDs do
2 v = $review;
3 pkr = GetPK(txopen.reviewerID);
4 txorigin = (accpub, pkr, userID, v);
5 sigi = Πts.ThresSign(txorigin, tski);
6 send txorigin to other validator to get other valid sigi’s and
store them in set Ssigi ;
7 if GetNum(Ssigi) ≥ k then
8 sig = Πts.SigShareComb(Ssigi , k);
9 txtransfer = (txorigin, sig);
10 set the balance of accpub to GetBalance(accpub) - v;
11 set the balance of pkr to GetBalance(pkr) + v;
12 if txopen.result = accept then
13 v = $incentive;
14 pkr = GetPK(txopen.userID);
15 txorigin = (accpub, pkr, userID, v);
16 sigi = Πts.ThresSign(txorigin, tski);
17 send txorigin to other validator to get other valid sigi’s and
store them in set Ssigi ;
18 if GetNum(Ssigi) ≥ k then
19 sig = Πts.SigShareComb(Ssigi , k);
20 txtransfer = (txorigin, sig);
21 set the balance of accpub to GetBalance(accpub) - v;
22 set the balance of pkr to GetBalance(pkr) + v;
23 if GetDeposit(txopen.userID) = 1/*GetDeposit() is a function
to get the deposit state*/ then
24 v = $deposit;
25 pkr = GetPK(txopen.userID);
26 txorigin = (accpub, pkr, userID, v);
27 sigi = Πts.ThresSign(txorigin, tski);
28 send txorigin to other validator to get other valid sigi’s and
store them in set Ssigi ;
29 if GetNum(Ssigi) ≥ k then
30 sig = Πts.SigShareComb(Ssigi , k);
31 txtransfer = (txorigin, sig);
32 set the balance of accpub to GetBalance(accpub) - v;
33 set the balance of pkr to GetBalance(pkr) + v;
34 store all txtransfer’s in set Stxtransfer ;
35 return Stxtransfer ;
Public account. A public account accpub, which is main-
tained by all validators, is required to process deposits from
authors and reward fees for reviewers and authors. To reduce
the risk of accpub, we utilize threshold signature to manage this
account when any funds are transferred from this account, i.e.,
before submitting a paper, the author should pay funds as a
deposit to accpub; after reviewing a valid paper, all validators
control accpub to refund the deposit to the author and distribute
rewards to author and related reviewers. Note that we set the
threshold for the threshold signature scheme to be the same
as that of the TIBGS scheme.
Dynamic update. The group signature used in Open-Pub
needs a large setup cost to create and exchange keys as
described in Fig. 1. However, the group signature does not
support dynamic update of participant group, which means the
participant group cannot be updated too frequently. Moreover,
when the participant group changed, members (i.e., validators)
of this group must update their corresponding keys to ensure
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Algorithm 8: - VerTx
Input: tx,mpk, grpID, accpub
Output: b
1 if tx = txsubmit then
2 if tx.tag = real then
3 b = Πs.Verify(tx.pksender, tx, tx.sig);
4 else if tx.tag = annoymity then
5 b = TIBGS.Verify(tx, tx.ssig,mpk, grpID);
6 else if tx = txdistribute||tx = txreview||tx = txopen then
7 b = Πs.Verify(tx.pksender, tx, tx.sig);
8 else if tx = txtransfer then
9 if GetBalance(tx.pksender) < tx.v then
10 return 0;
11 else
12 if tx.pksender = accpub then
13 b = Πts.Verify(tx.pksender, tx, tx.sig);
14 else
15 b = Πs.Verify(tx.pksender, tx, tx.sig);
16 if b = 1 then
17 set the balance of tx.pksender to GetBalance
(tx.pksender) - tx.v;
18 set the balance of tx.pkreceiver to GetBalance
(tx.pkreceiver) + tx.v;
19 return b;
the validity of group signature. To achieve dynamic update of
the participant group, we can use epoch scheme as follows:
at the beginning of each epoch, validators can vote to append
new members into this group or remove malicious validators
from this group. To reduce the communication cost of the
distributed key generation (DKG), readers can refer [32] to
obtain the DKG solution.
Reward. In Open-Pub, validators reward reviewers and
authors for their contributions, and these rewards are generated
by the blockchain. In terms of rewards, we mainly refer to the
existing publication systems for improvement, but we do not
differentiate reviewers in detail. In order to better motivate
reviewers, it is important to distinguish between reviewers,
such as more rewards for serious reviewers. The anonymity is
the main goal of our system, we will investigate how to better
motivate authors and reviewers using game theory as a future
work.
B. Analysis
Anonymity. Open-Pub implements a double-blind review
through TIBGS and asymmetric encryption. Open-Pub imple-
ments anonymous transactions through TIBGS and authors can
hide their identities by publishing papers through anonymous
transactions. Only when the number of validators reaches the
threshold can they collectively reveal the sender of the anony-
mous transaction. In order to hide the identity of the reviewer,
we do not send the transaction directly to the reviewer. We will
first sign the identity of the reviewer and the paper information
to obtain the signature, and then use the key of the reviewer to
encrypt the signature, the identity of the reviewer and the paper
information. Only the corresponding reviewer can decrypt the
ciphertext. The identity of the reviewer and the information of
the paper will be known to the author only after the reviewer
has reviewed the paper.
Accountability. In Open-Pub, only author accounts can
generate anonymous transactions. While the identity of the
anonymous author will be disclosed later, anonymous trans-
actions during this time can cause the author to send spam
transactions without being detected. In addition to verifying
the identity of the author, we require the author to pay a
deposit upon registration. Doing evil will cause the deposit
to be locked up completely.
Recoverability. The group private key is associated with
the identity of the user, which has the advantage that the
key can be recovered by reexecuting TIBGS.ExtShare
and TIBGS.ReconstKey algorithms. That is, validators
whose quantity exceeds the threshold number can regenerate
the group private key for the user in case of key loss.
VII. IMPLEMENTION AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we describe the implementation of Open-
Pub, and then we present comprehensive experiment results
to demonstrate its performance.
A. Implemention
We implement the Open-Pub system based on Ethereum
source code in Golang language. Since Open-Pub is based on
TIBGS, threshold signature and blockchain, our implemention
mainly includes the following components:
TIBGS. To implement TIBGS, we use the PBC (Pairing-
Based Cryptography) library which implements pairing-based
cryptosystems in C language and a Go wrapper to use PBC.
Based on PBC, we implement 8 algorithms of TIBGS includ-
ing Setup, GrpSetUp, ExtShare, ReconstKey, Sign,
Verify, OpenPart and Open.
Threshold signature. We choose the threshold BLS [33]
signature scheme as our threshold signature, and we imple-
ment it based on a go library https://github.com/dfinity-side-
projects/go-dfinity-crypto.
PBFT and Threshold. In Open-Pub, we adopt the PBFT
algorithm as the consensus mechanism and PBFT algorithm
requires 3f + 1 replicas to ensure security and activity in the
case of f failed nodes. We also need to set the threshold
parameter of TIBGS and threshold signature, and we can set
the threshold parameter as (2f + 1, 3f + 1) to match PBFT
algorithm.
Transactions. In order to realize the function of paper
review, we extend Ethereum by defining five types of transac-
tions: txtransfer, txsubmit, txdistribute, txreview, txopen. These trans-
actions involve three signature algorithms including ECDSA
signature [34], TIBGS signature and threshold signature.
Txsubmit will select the TIBGS signature or ECDSA signature
based on the different submission methods, txtransfer will select
the threshold signature or ECDSA signature based on the
different accounts and other types of transactions will use the
ECDSA signature algorithm.
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B. Experiments and Performance
Table II shows the computation and communication costs of
TIBGS. With the exception of some constants, the computation
and communication costs are determined by the threshold and
the number of validators.
TABLE II
Computation and Communication Costs of TIBGS
Algorithm Computation Communication
Setup 2 + k Exp O(n2)
GrpSetUp 6 Exp O(n2)
ExtShare 3 Exp −
ReconstKey (4k + 6) Exp + 9 Pairing O(k)
Sign 1 Pairing + 21 Exp −
Verify 3 Pairing + 10 Exp −
OpenPart 2 Pairing −
Open (2k + 1) Exp O(k)
Note: Exp denotes exponentiation, Pairing denotes bilinear pair-
ings, k denotes threshold value and n is the number of
validators of Open-Pub.
To evaluate the performance of Open-Pub and underlying
TIBGS scheme, we deploy our system on Aliyun ecs.g6.xlarge
virtual machines, each of which has 4 vCPU and 16GB
memory. We run 6 docker containers on each virtual machine
used to run the blockchain nodes independently and we use
Python language to develop a set of automated testing tools
to aid our experiments. With these tools, we can measure
the performance of TIBGS scheme and assess the impact
of different thresholds on block size, block consensus time,
transaction latency and throughput.
We first test the performance of the TIBGS scheme.
We present the performance of each algorithm of TIBGS
under different (t, n)-threshold. We configure the threshold
of Open-Pub to be (11, 16), (15, 22), (21, 31), (25, 37),
(31, 46), (35, 52) respectively and we set Open-Pub as grpID.
As showed in Fig. 3, the computation time for Setup,
GrpSetUp, ReconstKey and Open increases steadily as
the threshold increases, and ExtShare,Sign,Verify and
OpenPart have almost fixed time costs. This is consistent
with our analytical results summarized in Table II.
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Fig. 3: Time costs for algorithms of TIBGS in different
threshold settings.
In the test, we divide all transactions into TXETH, TXGS
and TXTS according to the type of signature, where TXETH
represents ECDSA signature transaction, TXGS represents
TIBGS signature transaction, and TXTS represents threshold
signature transaction. The signature size and verification time
of the three signature algorithms are showed in Table III. We
deploy some independent nodes to simulate the user node,
which can generate TXETH, TXGS or TXTS in different
thresholds settings.
TABLE III
Signature Size and Verification Time
Signature Signature size Verification time
ECDSA signature 65 bytes 0.2 ms
TIBGS Signature 533 bytes 20.1 ms
Threshold signature 32 bytes 0.7 ms
At different thresholds, we measure the block size and
the block consensus time when only one type of transaction
is sent. Fig. 4 shows that the block size dose not change
much under different thresholds. The block size of all TXGS
transactions is about 90KB, for all TXTS transactions it is
about 48KB, and for all TXETH transactions it is about
51KB. The difference of block size under the same threshold
mainly comes from the different size of ECDSA signature,
threshold signature and TIBGS signature. This indicates that
the threshold does not affect the packaging process of the
transaction.
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Fig. 4: Block size in different thresholds settings.
(11,16) (15,22) (21,31) (25,37) (31,46) (35,52)
Threshold
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Bl
oc
k 
co
ns
en
su
s t
im
e(
se
c)
TXGS
TXTS
TXETH
Fig. 5: Block consensus time in different thresholds settings.
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Fig. 5 shows that the block consensus time increases with
the increase of the threshold. The block consensus time of
TXGS transactions is the largest, and the block consistency
time of TXTS and TXETH is close. As the threshold in-
creases, the PBFT algorithm needs more time to consensus.
The difference of the block consensus time under the same
threshold is related to the verification time of TXGS, TXTS
and TXETH. In order to ensure the anonymity of TXGS, the
verification process of TXGS is much more complicated than
that of TXTS and TXETH.
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Fig. 6: Transaction confirming latency in different thresholds
settings.
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Fig. 7: How t with a (t, 31)-threshold setting influences the
transaction confirming latency.
We measure the transaction confirming latency, which is the
time between the transaction being issued by user and being
confirmed by Open-Pub. Fig. 6 shows that the transaction
confirming latency of TXGS is greater than that of TXTS and
TXETH, and both increase with the increase of threshold. The
increase of threshold will lead to the increase of consensus
time, and naturally the transaction confirming latency will
increase. The difference in transaction confirmation latency
under the same threshold is due to the different validation
times for the three types of signatures. Under the condition of
satisfying the PBFT algorithm, we set t as 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31
for a (t, 31)-threshold Open-Pub system. Fig. 7 shows that
the transaction confirmation latency is growing steadily as t
increases. The larger t increases the block consensus time.
(11,16) (15,22) (21,31) (25,37) (31,46) (35,52)
Threshold
10
20
30
40
50
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Fig. 8: Throughput for Open-Pub in different thresholds
settings.
Fig. 8 shows that the TPS (transactions per second) of the
three types of transactions decreases as the threshold increases
and the TPS of TXETH is the maximum and TPS of TXGS
is the minimum. As the block consensus time increases with
the threshold and the number of transactions per block remains
roughly the same, TPS naturally declines. The block consensus
time of TXGS is the largest, so TPS of TXGS is the smallest.
Overall, the Open-Pub system has better performance for
three types of transactions. But the system has a slight perfor-
mance degradation when handling TXGS, which is the price
of anonymity.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented Open-Pub, a trans-
parent privacy-preserving academic publication system on
blockchain. In Open-Pub, we design a threshold group sig-
nature TIBGS, and we use TIBGS and asymmetric encryption
to protect the privacy of authors and reviewers. In addition, we
improve transparency and fairness of the entire review process
through blockchain. We have analyzed the performance and
security of Open-Pub, and implemented Open-Pub based on
Ethereum source code. Experimental results show that Open-
Pub is highly efficient in dealing with anonymous transactions.
Future work can study appropriate incentive mechanisms
to encourage participation of authors, readers and reviewers.
Meanwhile, it may be also interesting to expand Open-Pub
with more accurate metrics like impact factors for authors,
reviewers, conferences and journals.
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APPENDIX
A. Identity-based Group Signature
An ID-based group signature IBGS scheme Λ consists
of six polynomial time algorithms (Setup,GrpSetUp,
Extract,Sign,Verify,Open):
• Setup(1λ) → (mpk,msk). This algorithm generates a
master public/private key pair (mpk,msk).
• GrpSetUp(grpID,msk)→ (gsk, gvk). GrpID is a string
that identifies the group. This algorithm on input of grpID
and msk and outputs a group secret key gsk. This gsk
belongs to the group manager.
• Extract(userID, gsk) → usk. The group manager exe-
cutes the algorithm and outputs the group private key usk,
which is sent to the user.
• Sign(m, usk)→ σ. Each user can execute the algorithm
and generate a signature σ corresponding to the message
m.
• Verify(m,σ,mpk, grpID)→ {0, 1}. This algorithm can
verify whether the signature is generated by user in the
group.
• Open(gsk, σ,m) → userID. The group manager can
execute the algorithm and reveal the identifier userID of
the user who produced the signature σ corresponding to
the message m.
Security Model. We recall the security model defined by
Smart and Warinschi [7] for the identity-based group signa-
ture case. The security model defines two security notions,
namely full-anonymity and full-traceability. Full-anonymity
captures the anonymity property of the TIBGS scheme by an
indistinguishability experiment between an adversary and the
group signature scheme, while full-traceability captures the
traceability property by an traceability experiment between an
adversary and the group signature scheme.
The full-anonymity experiment for the IBGS scheme de-
fined in [7] is defined in Fig. 9:
Definition 4 (Full-anonymity). Let Λ = (Setup,
GrpSetUp, Extract, Sign, Verify, Open) be an identity-
based group signature scheme. We say that Λ is fully-
anonymous if for all sufficiently large security parameter
k ∈ N and any proper probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
adversaryA, its advantage AdvanonΛ,A (1λ) = |Pr[ExpanonΛ,A (1λ) =
1] - 12 | is negligible.
It has been proved in [7] that the IBGS in [7] is fully
anonymous. We omit the full-traceability experiment and the
corresponding theorem for conciseness.
B. POK:Proof of Knowledge
The proof of knowledge and its verification [7] are used in
the TIBGS.Sign and TIBGS.Verify algorithms. We set:
14
ExpanonΛ,A(1
λ) :
(mpk,msk)← Setup(1λ)
(grpID∗, userID0,userID1,m, state)←
AGrpSetup(·),Extract(·),Open(·)1 (mpk)
b
$← {0, 1}
σ∗ ← Sign(m, usk), where ((grpID∗, userIDb), usk) ∈
userIDs
b′ ← AGrpSetup(·),Extract(·),Open(·)2 (σ∗, state)
if b′ = b return 1
else return 0
OGrpSetUpmsk (grpID) :
if ∃ (grpID, gsk) ∈ grpIDs
return gsk
else gsk← GrpSetUp(msk, grpID)
return gsk
OExtractmsk,gsk (grpID,userID) :
if @ (grpID, gsk) ∈ grpIDs
gsk← GrpSetUp(msk, grpID)
if @ ((grpID, userID), usk) ∈ userIDs
usk← Extract(gsk, userID)
return usk
OOpengsk (grpID, σ,m) :
if ∃ (grpID, gsk) ∈ grpIDs
return userID← Open(gsk, σ,m)
else return ⊥
Fig. 9: The full-anonymity experiment for IBGS in [7]
fˆ = (uˆ0 · uˆG(grpID)1 ), g = e(h1, gˆ2)
A proof of knowledge
∑
is generated by:
` = {cˆ6 = uˆx2 ·uˆy4∧e1 = gz∧eˆ2 = fˆz∧e3 =nx ·gz : (x, y, z)}
where x, y and z are hidden, and the rest of the parameters are
public. The variable is named to help the reader understand
how the proof matches the variable in TIBGS. We show the
process of POK algorithm in Fig. 10.
• Prover:
Prover generates random numbers k1, k2, k3 ∈ Zq and
calculates:
rˆ1 ← uˆk12 · uˆk24 , r2 ← gk3 , rˆ3 ← fˆk3 , τ4 ←nk1 · gk3
c← H(grpID||uˆ0||uˆ1||uˆ2||uˆ4||g||fˆ ||
n||g||d6||e1||e2||rˆ1||r2||rˆ3||τ4)
s1 ← k1 + c · x, s2 ← k2 + c · y, s3 ← k3 + c · z
The resulting proof is
∑← (c, s1, s2, s3).
• Verifier:
To verify the proof
∑
, verifier first computes:
rˆ′1 ← uˆs12 · uˆs24 · cˆ−c6 , r2′ ← gs3 · e−c1 , rˆ′3 ← fˆs3 · eˆ−c2 ,
τ4
′ ←ns1 · gs3 · e−c3
and then check:
c = H(grpID||uˆ0||uˆ1||uˆ2||uˆ4||g||fˆ ||n||g||
d6||e1||e2||rˆ′1||r2′||rˆ′3||τ4′)
Fig. 10: The Process of POK
C. Threshold Identity-based Group Signature
The full-anonymity experiment is defined in Fig. 11. The
adversary is allowed to query several oracles, GrpSetUp,
ExtShare and OpenPart. The adversary generates a group
identity and two user identities for which it will be challenged
with a signature signed by one of the users. TIBGS achieves
full anonymity if the adversary fails to guess the correct user
identity with non-negligible probability.
ExpanonΠ,A(1
λ) :
(mpk,msk)← Setup(1λ)
(grpID∗, userID0, userID1,m, state)←
AGrpSetup,ExtShare,OpenPart1 (mpk)
b
$← {0, 1}
σ∗ ← Sign(m, usk), where usk← {uski}i∈S
and ((grpID∗, i, userIDb), uski) ∈ userIDs
b′ ← AGrpSetup,ExtShare,OpenPart2 (σ∗, state)
if b′ = b return 1
else return 0
OGrpSetUpmsk (grpID, i) :
if ∃ (grpID, i, gski, gvki) ∈ grpIDs
return gski, gvki
else gski, gvki ← GrpSetUp(grpID, i,msk)
return gski, gvki
OExtSharemsk,gski (grpID, i, userID) :
if @ (grpID, i, gski) ∈ grpIDs
gski ← GrpSetUp(grpID, i,msk)
if @ ((grpID, i, userID), uski) ∈ userIDs
uski ← ExtShare(gski, userID)
return uski
OOpenPartgski (grpID, i, σ,m) :
if ∃ (grpID, i, gski) ∈ grpIDs
return oki ← OpenPart(gski, σ,m)
else return ⊥
Fig. 11: The full anonymity experiment for TIBGS. It
maintains two lists: grpIDs contains all group identities
with their private keys, and userIDs contains all user
identities with their private keys. SgrpID∗ represents the index
set of the group managers.
The full-traceability experiment is defined in Fig. 12. Sim-
ilar to the full-anonymity experiment, the adversary is also
allowed to query several oracles, GrpSetUp, ExtShare,
Sign and OpenPart. The adversary generates a group
identity and a signature of a message m. TIBGS achieves
full traceability if the signature produced by the adversary
cannot be traced to one of the corrupted users with negligible
probability.
Proof. We reduce the full anonymity of our TIBGS scheme
(denoted as Π) to that of the IBGS scheme (denoted as Λ)
in [7]. Suppose there is a polynomial-time adversary A can
break the full anonymity of Π, we construct another adversary
B that uses A as a subroutine to break the full anonymity of
Λ.
The challenger C of Λ executes Setup to output mpk and
gives it to B as in Fig. 9. Then B passes msk to A. As per
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ExptraceΠ,A(1
λ) :
(mpk,msk)← Setup(1λ)
(m,σ, grpID∗)← AGrpSetup,ExtShare,OpenPart1 (mpk)
let gsk∗i = GrpSetUp(grpID
∗, i,msk) for i ∈ SgrpID∗
oki ← OpenPart(gsk∗i , σ,m)
userID← Open({oki}i∈SgrpID∗ )
if Verify(m,σ,mpk, grpID∗)= false or
(grpID∗, i, userID)
∈ corrgrpIDs for at most t− 1 different i
return 0
else return 1
OGrpSetUpmsk (grpID, i) :
if ∃ (grpID, i, gski, gvki) ∈ grpIDs
return gski, gvki
else gski, gvki ← GrpSetUp(grpID, i,msk)
return gski, gvki
OExtSharemsk,gski (grpID, i, userID, type) :
if @ (grpID, i, gski) ∈ grpIDs
gski ← GrpSetUp(grpID, i,msk)
if @ ((grpID, i, userID), uski) ∈ userIDs
uski ← Extract(gski, userID)
if type = corrupt
add (grpID, i, userID) to corrgrpIDs
return uski
OSignusk (grpID, userID,m) :
if ∃((grpID, i, userID), uski) ∈ userIDs
usk← ReconstKey(userID, {uski}i∈S)
σ ← Sign(m, usk)
return σ
else return ⊥
OOpenPartgski (grpID, i, σ,m) :
if ∃ (grpID, i, gski) ∈ grpIDs
return oki ← OpenPart(gski, σ,m)
else return ⊥
Fig. 12: The full traceability experiment for TIBGS. It
maintains three lists: corrgrpIDs contains the corrupted
user identities, grpIDs contains all group identities with
their private keys, and userIDs contains all user identities
with their private keys. SgrpID∗ represents the index set of the
group managers.
the full-anonymity experiment, A makes the following oracle
queries, which are answered by B as follows:
• OGrpSetUpmsk (grpID, i): If grpID 6= grpID∗, B obtains gsk
by querying the oracle OGrpSetUpmsk (grpID) in Fig. 9.
Then B computes gski as well as gvki from gsk and i
for A. Otherwise, B randomly generates gski and gvki
for A.
• OExtSharemsk,gski (grpID, i, userID): If userID 6= userID0
or userID1, B obtains usk by querying the oracle
OExtSharemsk,gsk (grpID, userID) in Fig. 9. Then B computes
uski from usk and i for A. Otherwise, B randomly
generates uski for A.
• OOpenPartgski (grpID, i, σ,m): If grpID 6= grpID∗, B obtains
gsk by querying the oracle OGrpSetUpmsk (grpID). Then B
computes gski as well as gvki from gsk and i. After that,
B executes OpenPart(gski, σ,m) and return the result
to A. Otherwise, B randomly generates oki for A.
After A has made enough oracle queries, A outputs
(grpID∗, userID0, userID1,m, state) to B, who will forward
the output to the challenger C. Then C outputs a signature
σ∗ to B who forwards σ∗ to A and obtains the output b′ from
A. Finally, B outputs b′ as its guess for b chosen by C.
Clearly, the adversary B has the same advantage of the
experiment as A, i.e.,
AdvanonΛ,B (1
λ) = AdvanonΠ,A(1
λ).
Since no such adversary B can break full anonymity of Λ, we
conclude that A cannot break full anonymity of Π.
